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INTRODUCTION.
LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL INTERACTION IN
INSURANCE LAW

THOMAS 0.

SMITH*

In North Dakota the legislature and the judiciary interact to
create the law of the state. This interaction is especially prominent
in insurance law. The importance of the legislature's actions is
indicated by section 1-01-06 of the North Dakota Century Code,
which provides that "there is no common law in any case where the
law is declared by the code.'' I Therefore, when the legislature
enacts an insurance statute, the courts must apply and interpret the
particular provision. The interaction can also happen the other
way; following a court decision applying and interpreting an
insurance provision, the legislature can react by passing a law
clarifying its intent or otherwise affecting the court's decision. Such
legislative reaction to a court decision is illustrated by the case of St.
PaulMercury Insurance Co. v. Andrews. 2
Eileen Andrews was a passenger in an uninsured vehicle when
she was injured in a one car accident. 3 The Andrews insured their
three automobiles under one policy with St. Paul Mercury
Insurance Company. 4 St. Paul paid the Andrews $15,000 in basic
no-fault benefits, and $25,000 in uninsured motorist benefits, but
J.D., University. of North Dakota, 1969; member of the Nlorth Dakota Bar; partner, Zuger &
Bucklin, Bismarck, North Dakota.
1. N.D. CENT. CODE S 1-01-06 (1975).

2. 321 N.W.2d 483 (N.D. 1982).
3. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co. v. Andrews, 321 N.W.2d 483, 484-85 (N.D. 1982).
4. Id. at 484.
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refused to pay an additional $30,000 and $50,000 under those
respective provisions. 5 The issue before the North Dakota Supreme
Court was whether the no-fault and the uninsured motorist
coverages could be "stacked" to provide additional benefits up to
6
the extent of Eileen's injuries.
The court concluded that the North Dakota statute concerning
basic no-fault benefits prohibited stacking, but that the uninsured
motorist statute did not prohibit stacking. 7 The court also
concluded, however, that the language of the insurance policy
clearly prohibited any stacking and that, since the contract did not
violate any established public policy, it was enforceable. 8 Justice
Pederson, writing for the majority, stated that "[s]ome of the
courts that have addressed various aspects of 'stacking' have
arbitrarily stated that 'public policy' prohibits 'stacking,' while
other courts have arbitrarily stated that 'public policy' permits
'stacking'.. .. We reiterate our suggestion that legislative attention
is warranted. "9

Thus, the court was unwilling to decide such an important
area of public policy without legislative input. In the following
legislative session, the legislature reacted to the court's appeal by
enacting legislation that specifically prohibited the stacking of
coverage under basic no-fault provisions 10 and uninsured motorist
provisions.11 By so doing, the legislature provided the judiciary
5. See id. at 485.
6. Id. at 484. "Stacking" is a term used by the courts when considering coverage under more
than one policy providing insurance for an accident (the stacking of policies), or when considering
one policy providing insurance for an accident and the policy insures more than one motor vehicle
(the stacking of coverages). See Wasche v. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co., 268 N.W.2d 913, 914, 917
(Minn. 1978) (the maximum coverages for no-fault basic economic loss benefits under two insurance
policies were "stacked," permitting the insured to recover benefits to the extent of actual losses up to
the combined policy limits of both policies); Roepke v. Western Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co., 302 N.W.2d
350 (Minn. 1981) (permitted the "stacking" of no-fault insurance coverages on six vehicles insured

under a single policy).
7. 321 N.W.2d at 489.

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. See N.D. CENT. CoDE

5

26.1-41-14 (Supp. 1985). Section 26.1-41-14 of the North Dakota

Century Code provides as follows:
When an injured person is provided basic no-fault benefits by an insurance policy
issued in compliance with this chapter, the injured person is covered only to the extent
of the basic no-fault benefits provided on the secured motor vehicle inolved in the
accident. If any person is injured while occupying an unsecured motor vehicle, basic
no-fault benefits are only available to the extent of the applicable basic no-fault
benefits provided to the injured person as the owner of a secured motor vehicle or as a
relative of the owner of a secured motor vehicle. In either instance, basic no-fault
benefits on any secured motor vehicle may not be added or stacked upon basic no-fault
benefits available from any other source.
Id.
1I. See id. S 26.1-40-14(2). Subsection 26.1-40-14(2) of the North Dakota Century Code
provides as follows:
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with a clear public policy statement to follow in the future.
The interaction between the legislature and the judiciary also
results from the courts' interpretation and application of existing
statutes. This interaction is illustrated by Milbank Mutual Insurance
Co. v. DairylandInsurance Co. 12 In Milbank the defendant, Dairyland,
appealed from a summary judgment in which the district court had
concluded that Dairyland had a duty to defend the insured,
Hagstrom, under its automobile insurance policy, and that the
plaintiff, Milbank, had no such obligation under its farm owner13
ranch owner's policy.
Hagstrom had an automobile insurance policy with Dairyland
and a farm owner-ranch owner's policy with Milbank.' He was
sued when a third party was injured while unloading hay bales
from Hagstrom's truck which was parked on Hagstrom's farm.' 5
Dairyland's automobile policy provided for the payment of
damages for bodily injuries that arose "out of the ownership,
maintenance or use of a car or other motor vehicle," but did not
contain a definition of that phrase.t 6 Dairyland contended that the
definition set forth in subsection 26-41-03(11) of the North Dakota
Century Code should be read into the insurance policy, and that,
based on the statute, the district court had erred in concluding that
Dairyland was obligated to defend Hagstrom. I7
The court approached the problem as one of statutory
Any motor vehicle liability insurance policy which provides uninsured motorist
coverage, as specified in subsection 1, must provide that an insured or named insured
is only protected to the extent of the coverage provided on the vehicle covered by the
policy and involved in the accident. If no such vehicle is involved, coverage is only
available to the extent of the applicable uninsured motorist coverage provided on any
of the insured or named insured's vehicles. In either instance, coverage on any other
vehicle may not be added or stacked upon the applicable coverage.
Id.
12. 373 N.W.2d 888 (N.D. 1985).
13. Milbank Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 373 N.W.2d 888, 889 (N.D. 1985).
14. Id. at 890.
15. Id. A negligence action was commenced against Hagstrom to recover damages for the third
person's injuries. Id. Milbank and Dairyland denied liability; however Milbank provided Hagstrom
with a defense under a reservation of rights agreement. Id. Milbank then commenced a declaratory
judgment action seeking a declaration of its and Dairyland's rightsand obligations under their
respective policies. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 890-91. The former 5 26-41-03(11) of the North Dakota Century Code is now codified
at S 26.1-41-01(13). The subsection provides as follows:
"Operation of a motor vehicle" means operation, maintenance, or use of a motor
vehicle as a vehicle. Operation of a motor vehicle does not include conduct within the

course of a business of repairing, servicing, or otherwise maintaining motor vehicles
unless the injury occurs off the business premises, or conduct in the course of loading
and unloading the vehicle unless the injury occurs while occupying it.
N.D. CENT. CODE S 26.1-41-01(13) (Supp. 1985).
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construction and examined the legislature's intent as expressed in
the language of the statute. 1 8 The court concluded that nothing in
the language of the statutory provision or any other statute
mandated that the statutory definition be incorporated into the
insurance policy.' 9 Since the legislature did not desire mandatory
application of the statutory definition, and since there was no
public policy that necessitated incorporation of the provision, 20 the
court interpreted the policy without reference to the statutory
definition. 2' The court construed the phrase used in the policy to
include the unloading of a truck. 2 2 Thus, the court resolved the
conflict by interpreting the statutory provision in a manner
consistent with the legislature's intent.
In addition to the insurance statutes, other sections of the
Century Code also affect insurance law in North Dakota. North
Dakota's financial responsibility laws have had a tremendous
impact on automobile insurance policies. 23 In Richard v. Flifle 24 the
North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that North Dakota's
financial responsibility laws apply to voluntarily purchased liability
25
insurance policies.
In Fliflet a third party, Linde, applied for automobile
insurance on Daniel Bye's car. 26 Bye had been convicted of driving
while intoxicated and sought to avoid paying higher insurance
premiums. 27 Linde represented to State Farm that he was the
owner of the car and obtained the insurance. 2 In January 1983,
29
Fliflet borrowed Bye's car and was involved in an accident.
18. 373 N.W.2d at 891-92.
19. Id. at 892.
20. See generally Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1985) (public policy required the
incorporation of a statutory provision preventing rescission of insurance policies into policies
purchased pursuant to the financial responsibility laws).
21. 373 N.W.2d at 892-93.
22. Id. at893.
23. See generally N.D. CENT. CODE chs. 39-16, 39-16.1 (1980 & Supp. 1985). Chapters 39-16 and
39-16.1 of the North Dakota Century Code contain North Dakota's financial responsibility laws.
Chapter 39-16 imposes penalties against a motor vehicle owner or operator who has been involved in
an accident and does not establish that he is financially capable of responding in damages if he should
be found liable for bodily injuries or property damage sustained by any person in the accident. Id. ch.
39-16. Chapter 39-16.1 requires a motor vehicle owner or operator, who has been involved in an
accident, or who has been convicted of certain traffic violations, to establish proof of financial
responsibility to respond in damages for property damage and bodily injury which may occur as a
result of future accidents. Id. ch. 39-16.1.
24. 370 N.W.2d 528 (N.D. 1985).
25. Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 535 (N.D. 1985). For a complete discussion of Fliflet,
see Comment, Automobile - Insurance- The Requirements of North Dakota'sFinancialResponsibility Laws
Are Applicable to All Automobile Liability Insurance Policies, 62 N.D.L. REV. (1985) (authored by
Melanie Kopperud).
26. 370 N.W.2d at 529.
27. Id. at 536 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 529.
29. Id.
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When State Farm learned that Linde did not own the car, it
rescinded the policy, returned the entire premium, and denied
liability coverage for the accident.3 0 The issue before the court was
whether State Farm could properly rescind the policy after the
accident based on Linde's misrepresentation that he owned the
31
vehicle.
In reaching its conclusion, the court reviewed its prior decision
in Hughes v. State FarmMutualAutomobile Insurance Co. 32 In Hughes the
court held that a household or family exclusion clause 33 in an
automobile liability insurance policy violated North Dakota's
public policy of protecting innocent accident victims from financial
hardship, as expressed in the financial responsibility laws. 34 it
therefore incorporated subsections 1, 2, and 3 of section 39-16. 1-11
of the North Dakota Century Code, which define the coverage
required in a motor vehicle liability insurance policy, into
voluntarily purchased liability insurance policies. 35 The court in
Hughes, however, did not reach the issue of whether subsection 3930. Id.
31. Id. at 530.
32. 236 N.W.2d 870 (N.D. 1975).
33. A household or family exclusion clause provides that there is no liability coverage for injuries
sustained by the insured or members of the insured's family residing in the insured's household in an
accident caused by the negligent operation of a motor vehicle by the insured or the insured's family
member. Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 877 (N.D. 1975).
34. Id. at 885.
35. Id. Section 39-16.1-11 of the North Dakota Century Code provides as follows:
1. A 'motor vehicle liability policy' as said term is used in this chapter means an
owner's or an operator's policy of liability insurance, certified as provided in
sections 39-16.1-09 and 39-16.1 -10 as proof of financial responsibility, and issued,
except as otherwise provided in section 39-16.1-10, by an insurance carrier duly
authorized to transact business in this state, to or for the benefit of the person
named therein as insured.
2. Such owner's policy of liability insurance:
a. Shall designate by explicit description or by appropriate reference all motor
vehicles with respect to which coverage is thereby to be granted; and
b. Shall insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using
such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of
such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages
arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles within
the United States of America or the Dominion of Canada, subject to limits
exclusive of interest and costs, with respect to each such motor vehicle, as
follows: twenty-five thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of one
person in any one accident and subject to said limit for one person, fifty
thousand dollars because of bodily injury to or death of two or more persons in
any one accident, and twenty-five thousand dollars because of injury to or
destruction of property of others in any one accident.
3. Such operator's policy of liability insurance shall insure the person named as
insured therein against loss from the liability imposed upon him by law for
damages arising out of the use by him of any motor vehicle, either unlimited, or
limited by excluding certain classes or types of motor vehicles, within the same
territorial limits and subject to the same limits of liability as are set forth above
with respect to an owner's policy of liability insurance.
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 39-16.1-11(l)-(3) (Supp. 1985).
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16.1-11(6) of the North Dakota Century Code, which provides that
the insurance carrier's liability becomes absolute upon the
occurrence of an accident, was incorporated
into voluntarily
36
purchased liability insurance policies.
The court in Fliflet examined the financial responsibility laws
in an attempt to determine whether the legislature intended to
incorporate subsection 39-16.1-11(6) of the North Dakota Century
Code into voluntarily purchased liability insurance policies. 37 The
court again recognized that the overriding purpose of the financial
responsibility laws was "to protect innocent victims of motor
vehicle accidents from financial disaster. "38 The court determined
that this purpose would be defeated if an insurer were allowed to
rescind a policy after the occurrence of an accident. 39 Furthermore,
the court concluded that since subsection 39-16.1-11(6) of the
North Dakota Century Code was a specific provision, it prevailed
over other statutory provisions generally applicable to insurance
contracts. 40 Therefore, State Farm could not properly rescind the
insurance policy."1
Justice VandeWalle dissented, stating that he doubted that "it
was the intent of the Legislature, and therefore the public policy of
this State, to in any manner encourage the falsification of insurance
applications.' '42 During the next session, the legislature may very
well consider whether automobile insurance policies can be
rescinded by an insurance company when there has been a material
misrepresentation by the insured.
The interaction between the legislature and the judiciary has
also had a substantial affect upon North Dakota's declaratory
36. 236 N.W.2d at 886. Subsection 39-16.1-11(6) of the North Dakota Century Code provides,
in pertinent part, as follows:
6. Every motor vehicle liability policy shall be subject to the following provisions
which need not be contained therein:
a. The liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by
this chapter shall become absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said
motor vehicle liability policy occurs; said policy may not be cancelled or
annulled as to such liability by any agreement between the insurance carrier
and the insured after the occurrence of the injury or damage; no statement
made by the insured or on his behalf and no violation of said policy shall defeat
or void said policy.
6

N.D. CENT. CODE S 39-16.1-1 l( Xa) (Supp. 1985).
37. See Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 532-35 (N.D, 1985).
38. Id. at 534.
39. Id. at 535.
40. Id. Section 1-02-07 of the North Dakota Century Code provides that when a special
statutory provision conflicts with a general statutory provision, the special provision prevails. N.D.
CENT. CODE 5 1-02-07 (1975).
4!. 370 N.W.2d at 535.
42. Id. at 536 (VandeWalle, J., dissenting).

19861

INTRODUCTION

353

judgment statute. 43 A motion for declaratory judgment is
frequently used to determine issues arising under an insurance
policy, particularly to resolve the issue of whether an insurance
44
company has a duty to defend the insured.
In United Pacific Insurance Co. v.Aetna Insurance Co. 45 the North
Dakota Supreme Court considered whether an action for a
declaratory judgment regarding an insurance company's duty to
defend an insured raised a justiciable controversy. 46 In United
Pacific a separate action was underway to determine liability for an
accident involving the insured. 7 The court concluded that since the
issue of liability in the separate action had not yet been determined,
the issue concerning which insurance company had the duty to
48
defend the insured did not present ajusticiable controversy.
Subsequent to United Pacific, the North Dakota Legislature
amended section 32-23-06 of the North Dakota Century Code,
which had made the entering of a declaratory judgment
discretionary with the court. 49 Prior to the amendment, the statute
provided that a court had the authority to refuse to enter a
declaratory judgment if such action "would not terminate the
uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding." 50 The
amendment created an exception to a court's discretionary
authority by providing that a court must enter a declaratory
judgment in any action by or against an insurance company to
51
determine whether the insurance company has a duty to defend.
Thus, the legislature's reaction eliminated a court's discretion in
entering declaratory judgments in actions regarding an insurance
company's duty to defend.
These are but a few examples of the interaction between the
legislative and the judicial branches in the realm of insurance law.
This interaction is likely to continue. Thus, in predicting trends in
insurance law, an analysis of judicial action must be coupled with
43. Chapter 32-23 of the North Dakota Century Code contains North Dakota's declaratory
judgment provisions. See N.D. CENT. CODE ch. 32-23 (1976 & Supp. 1985).
44. See, e.g., American Hardware Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dairyland Ins. Co., 304 N.W.2d 687 (N.D.
1981) (declaratory action used to resolve dispute between two insurance companies concerning which
company was obliged to defend the insured).
45. 311 N.W.2d 170 (N.D. 1981).
46. United Pac. Ins. Co. v. Aetna Ins. Co., 311 N.W.2d 170, 172 (N.D. 1981).
47. Id. at 171. Marvin Schelske, an employee of Cochran Electric, was injured when a trucki
leased or rented -to Cochran by Martin Engineering tipped over. Id. Schelske brought a negligence
action against Martin Engineering. Id. Martin then commenced a third party action against
Cochran seeking contribution or indemnity if the court found Martin liable for damages to Schelske.

Id.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 172.
See 1983 N.D. Laws 377 (amending S 32-23-06 of the North Dakota Century Code).
N.D. CENT. CODE 5 32-23-06 (1976) (amended 1983).
Id. (Supp. 1985).
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an analysis of what the probable legislative reaction will be.
Insurance is no longer a frill; it is an economic necessity used
to protect an insured from adverse economic consequences. This
symposium exposes only a few of the problems that confront the
insurance industry today. For the insurance system to survive, the
courts and the legislature must balance the interests of the
insurance companies, the insureds, and the claimants. All should
be treated fairly and none favored to the detriment of the other.
Hopefully, discussions such as those stimulated by this symposium
will contribute to the viability of the insurance system in North
Dakota.

